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Introduction
The very first work that I read by Ruth Marcus, in 1977, was her piece "Extensionality" (1960) .
2 It awoke me from my Quinean dogmatic slumber. It explained that extensionality is not limited to the domain of extensional logic and showed how one could construct a range of notions of extensionality of various strengths, including for intensional contexts. It also seemed to me a remarkable example of how a philosopher and logician can construct a concept, instead of "deconstructing" it.
3
In the same article Ruth Marcus examined also the notion of identity and explained that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, that if two things which have all their properties in common they are identical (Id ind) (∀x) (∀y) ((Fy ↔ F x)) → ( x = y ) ) could also be weakened (to be distinct means to be discernibly distinct) .
She also hints, at the end of her essay that when the statement "involves only proper names", then replacement of the "Morning star" by "the evening star" in such statements as
It is necessary that the evening star is the morning star
yields no paradox such as Quine's famous paradox of the number of planets. It is clearly related to her theorem about the necessity of identity, which she established in her pioneering paper of 1946, and it anticipates the famous discussion of necessary identity statements with proper names in "Modalities and Modal languages" (1962) 4 .
Traditional debates about the nature of identity bear upon whether it can really be a formal property or relation of objects, since not all of the classical logical principles of identity seem to be formal at all. This has led philosophers to propose various non classical notions of identity and in particular to relativise the concept. But these attempts meet strong objections. I want here to examine another view, which, to my knowledge, has never been explicitly proposed, but which is in the same spirit as the relativisation idea, since it comes down to a contextual relativisation of identity. According to that putative view, identity is a functional property, multiply realised in various domains. This proposal is modelled along the lines of the functional conception of truth which has been defended by some writers recently. The parallel proposal of a functionalisation of truth would amount to construct identity as a kind of relative similarity. I try to
show that it does not succeed and that we have to stick to the classical absolute concept.
Absolute identity
The difficulties of the classical definition of identity are discussed by Ruth Marcus in her essay "Possibilia and possible worlds" in the context of a discussion of the nature of possibilia (1986, 1993:189-213) . Identity is taken to be a logical notion that one can characterise by the properties of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, indiscernibility, and substitutivity):
It seems to be the best way to define objecthood, and a primitive notion:
« Identity is the strongest equivalence relation that a thing bears only to itself. That there are individuals is already presupposed if the identity relation is to hold. The identity relation does not confer thinghood; identity is an essential feature of things. Individuals must be there before they enter into any relations, even relations of self-identity. Of course if we want to discover which objects a language or theory takes to be individuals, we look to see which objects are such that they can meaningfully enter into the identity relation. Quantification is not so clear a guide to ontology as is identity. No identity without entity. " 1993 : 200) The problem, however, as Marcus reminds us, is that the notion of identity is not so clear, and that its definition in terms of indiscernibility (Id The identity of indiscernibles cannot be fully logical or formal, for indiscernibility cannot define identity without further metaphysical assumptions.
There are indeed different criteria of the formal, but on many views, identity is not a logical constant 5 . Quine could not accept the necessity of identity as a formal property, except in the de dicto sense. But as Ruth
Marcus remarks, for instance in her "A Backward look at Quine's animadversions on modalities" (1988; 1993: 229) and in "Essentialism in modal logic " (1967; 1993: 50) , the necessity of identity does not need other kinds of essential properties than self-identity, and is committed only to an innocuous kind of essentialism. So there is a good ground to accept the necessity of identity among the formal-logical properties of identity. The situation is less clear with the non vagueness of identity, which has been defended by Gareth Evans on the basis of a famous argument which is reminiscent of Marcus's proof of the necessity of identity (Evans 1982) 6 . A lot of discussion has been devoted to whether identity statements can be vague or not, but it seems difficult to deny that the property of an object to be self-identical could be vague. So there is good ground for adding to the classical list of formal features of identity (reflexivity, transitivity, indiscernability, substitutivity) those of necessity and non vagueness. All 5 On Peacocke's criterion for logical constanthood (1976), identity does not come out as a logical constant.
From Leibniz's law of substitutivity one can derive from (2)and (4): (5) ~ (a=b) which contradicts the initial hypothesis that the identity statement 'a=b' inderterminately true. On Evans' argument, see Williamson 1994: 253-56 , and the references thereof. The proof given independently by Salmon 1977 is actually simpler. See also Salmon 2002. (1) Suppose a pair, <x, y>, for which there is no fact of identity or distinctness. (2) By contrast, there is a fact of identity for the reflexive pair <x, x>. (3) It follows <x, y> is distinct from . (4) Therefore, by standard set theory, x ≠ y. (5) Consequently, there is a fact of the matter. See also Engel 1999 , Parsons 2000 these make identity and absolute relation, which holds of objects independently of what kind of objects enter in the relation. In other words absolute identity characterises identity as a formal property in the sense that it is supposed to apply to any kind of object, whether it be physical, biological, mental, natural, artefactual, etc.. Any two objects, if they are identical, are identical simpliciter, and not relative to a kind or sort.
In he same article (1993: 228) Ruth Marcus notices that for Aristotle, essential properties are sortal, in contrast to the property of being an entity and the property of being self-identical. It is precisely because they wanted to include sortal properties within the property of being identical that some philosophers have attempted to relativise identity itself to sortals. Geach (1972) claimed that the absolute concept of identity does not fit our usual way of asking identity questions. When we ask whether one object is identical to another, we never ask whether they are identical simpliciter, but we always ask questions of the form: "What kind of thing is x?" and we always reply, in the Aristotelian mode, that x is an F, or G, etc. When we ask whether x is identical to y, it is always relative to a sortal F,G, etc. This is, in a sense, how it should be, since the formal properties of identity According to Geach, most of these paradoxes show that the predicate of identity, if it is to make sense within ordinary contexts, has to be relativised. "a = b " has always to be understood as (R) a is the same F as b
where 'F' is a sortal predicate. The problem, as David Wiggins has shown, is that relative identity (R) is incompatible with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles 8 . The dilemma is: either identity is absolute, but it can't really be a relation into which ordinary objects enter, or it is relative, but then it ceases to be a genuinely formal relation.
Geach's problem about relative identity and the issues raised by the paradoxes of identity show that there are is a sharp contrast between what logic tells us about the identity relation -which is absolute, simple, and necessary -and our identity judgments -which are relative, contextsensitive and contingent. Geach is right that in many contexts we do not ask whether a thing is identity to another simpliciter. Very often we satisfy ourselves with vague or loose identity statements ( "This is the same food as the one I had in another restaurant") or ambiguous ones ( for instance we are happy to accept certain type identity statements although we would reject their token counterparts : "This is the same ship as the one I took for Chios last year"), and we rarely care for what Thomas Reid called the "strict and philosophical sense" of identity (we almost never ask : "Is it really the same food as the one from the other restaurant ?", or " Is it the very same ship as the one you took for Chios last year?"). In such cases, identity is neither absolute nor transitive, and seems akin to a notion of similarity. Indeed there are cases where we are interested in the strict sense, as an when an Egyptologist asks whether the statue that he inspects in an antiquarian shop is the same as the one stolen last month by looters from excavations near Alexandria. But can we content ourselves with the observation that there is a conflict between the loose and ordinary sense on the one hand and the strict and philosophical sense on the other?
Although the notion of identity itself is not prima facie epistemic, the notion of an identity judgement is largely epistemic, and for this reason it is person and context relative. What counts as identity for one person in one circumstance depends on her interests and on her epistemic situation. The difference between identity judgements from one context to another are obviously differences about the epistemic criteria by which we judge one thing to be identical to or to differ from another, or differences about our epistemic interests in asking identity questions. Identity questions, however, are not only epistemological questions: they are also, and quite often, questions about what things are and about their nature. Now, even if we understand these questions as ontological questions, the problem of the variety of identity questions still arises. When we ask whether the statue that we are looking at in a shop in the Plaka is the same as the one in the Acropolis museum, we wonder about a difference in constitution. When we ask whether Theseus' ship at one time is the same as a ship of the same shape at another time, we wonder about a difference in material composition. These are principles about the individuation of entities in an objective and not in a mind depend sense. But these questions about individuation differ from identity questions "strictly" speaking. But we cannot rest content with the thought that questions about identity are distinct from questions about individuation. We want to know how they are related. Does individuation depend on identity or vice versa ?
Wiggins' individuative essentialism
In Sameness and Substance David Wiggins proposes a solution to this problem 9 . He holds that any entity has to conform to the formal principles of the absolute concept, which are norms for specific issues about individuation which occur in various contexts and relative to various purposes that we have of classifying objects into kinds. Without these principles, no judgement to the effect that x is identical to y can make sense. According to Wiggins, however, it does not follow from this that attributions of identity are independent of the implicit reference to some sortal or other. Although identity is absolute, "the sortal dependency of individuation" still holds. According to Wiggins' « individuative essentialism » it has to be true both that:
(1) Identity is absolute and defined by its formal properties (R, S, T, ind Id, . This is why, according to Carosella and Pradeu, the criterion of identity is continuity rather than identity. They show that any strong discontinuity within immune receptors and their targets gives rise to a reaction of the immune system, which does not discriminate between self and non self, but between endogenous or exogenous epitopes which are constantly present and others which break the continuity of interactions.
This is why, according to them, biological identity if nothing but a kind of continuity:
"The continuity hypothesis conceives of identity as an identity-continuity, since it claims that nothing more than the spatiotemporal continuity of adhesions between immune receptors and ligands defines immune identity.
This hypothesis can therefore be seen as the immunological point of view on the identity of organisms. According to the continuity hypothesis, nothing like a permanent 'core' to be preserved against all foreign threats is presupposed and thought to define immunity. Changes from the inside and changes from the outside equally can trigger an immune response, depending on the conditions of encounter." (Carosella and Pradeu 2006: 247) Another problem raised by Wiggins' conception is that it seems to presuppose a form of Aristotelian essentialism in biology. He holds in particular that the sortals upon which continuants depend are natural kinds. Or one has simply to bite the bullet, and reject the classical and absolute notion of identity.
The second difficulty of the pluralistic or anti-essentialist conception consists in its reduction of identity to continuity. As many discussions on the problem of personal identity have shown since Locke and Butler, identity is not the same thing as continuity. Wiggins' attempts at a conciliation of Leibnizian absolutessness with the variability of our identity judgements.
Functionalism about truth and identity
How can we reconcile the unity and the absoluteness of the identity relation with the plurality of the modes of constitution and of the conditions of persistence of objects of different kinds? A possible solution takes it inspiration from the familiar functionalist conception of mental states in the philosophy of mind. According to functionalism, the mental properties of an organism are defined by the causal role of the properties of this organism. In most contemporary versions of the view functional properties are second-order properties: they are role-properties of first-order (physical and biological) properties of organisms. These roles are "multiply realised" in these first order properties of the organisms, and supervene upon them, without being identical to these properties.
This familiar functionalist picture can be extended to other kinds of properties of a more formal or abstract sort. In particular a number of writers have proposed that truth could be conceived as a functional property defined at the abstract level as satisfying a set of "platitudes", and realised in various domains 14 Just as, according to functionalism about mental states, our use of "belief", "desire" and other mental terms, can be individuated in terms of the role that they play , together with other states, in mediating between inputs and outputs, we could say that the predicate "true" is a place mark for a certain role marked by a set of platitudes which FT There is a property T which play the truth role if and only if P is T iff P & P is T iff P is such that things are as P says they are & P is T if it is such that P can be justified but not T & P is T iff P is stable & T is the norm for belief, etc
The issue of the nature of the properties which "realise" these roles is left open. Truth is a property which can me variably realized, just as a functional property can be so. Summarizing the idea, Crispin Wright says:
" The concept of truth admits a uniform characterisation wherever it is applied -the characterisation given by the minimal platitudes, which determine what is essential to truth…The form of pluralism for which space is allowed by this overarching uniformity is variable realisation.
What constitutes the existence of a number is different from what
constitutes the existence of a material object." (Wright 1996) In other words truth is a second-order property of our statements, which has to be realised in various ways in first order properties which will underlie this role. definition, alethic functionalism entails that the properties which realise truth will not be uniform in all domains. In ethics truth may be realised as coherence, whereas it can be realised as correspondence in, say, physics, or as superwarrant 17 in mathematics, etc. For the view to make sense, the realiser properties must be such that the properties which play the truth role are uniform. But how can they be uniform if they are realised in different ways in each domain? The only way to make them uniform is to limit the truth role to the most trivial properties, such as the syntactic features of the truth predicate and the deflationary schema 'P' is true iff P. But then the view becomes hard to distinguish from deflationism about truth, the view that truth is but a "thin" property whose "essence" is exhausted by the deflationary schema. This is an unwelcome consequence, because functionalism about truth was supposed to give us an alternative to deflationism.
I shall not here dwell upon the difficulties of alethic functionalism 18 .
My purpose has been to introduce it in order to see whether a similar idea can be exploited with another "formal" notion, the notion of identity.
Actually the functionalist move has a long ancestry in scholastic metaphysics with other "formal" or what were called "transcendental"
notions ( res, verum, aliquid, bonum, unum) . Take the predicate "exists" 19 .
It is one thing for a sensation to exist, another thing for an image, yet another thing for a tree or a person, etc. Should we say that the notion of existence is ambiguous? This was the traditional view of the analogy of being. But we also want to say that there is something common to these different senses of "exist", a property which applies to all sorts of entities but which is realised in different ways whether it applies to to numbers, material objects, persons or images. Should we take the functionalist move The idea is that this functional property will be multiply realized depending on the kinds of objects to which it applies: the property of identity will be different depending upon whether we deal with material objects, artefacts, persons, or events, etc. In each domain there will be distinct individuation conditions. As far as I know, no one has proposed this kind of view in the literature. But it seems at least to make sense.
The problems, however, encountred with the functionalisation of truth reproduce with FI. If identity is the functional role made up of the conjunction of these "platitudes", should we say that identity is among the realiser properties -identity for artefacts, identity for persons, identity for material objects, etc. or at the level of the higher-order property? If the former, identity, as we saw for biological objects, can fail to realize come of the platitudes, such as transitivity, and the functional role ceases to be common to all the realisers. If the latter, the notion of identity becomes so thin and abstract that it cannot take in charge the conditions of individuation. We have made little progress. And the same instability as the one that affects truth functionalism holds for identity functionalism: either identity is uniform across the domains in which it is realized, but then it cannot be plural, or it is plural, but it looses its uniformity. According to identity functionalism, several ways in which things can be identical, and for a given identity relation I , the way in which I holds depends on its specific domain. For instance Tibbles is the same as Tib qua animal but not qua material object. anomalies, is that this strategy is not uniform and has a case to case flavor.
In this respect the functionalist idea preserves the unity of the higher-order property.
The alternative strategy consists in taking as primitive not the classical notion of identity, but a weaker notion, close to identity, such as relevant similarity. It has been often argued (e.g. by Jubien 1997) that most of our identity judgments are actually judgments about relevant similarity. This is what Douven and Liecok (2010) propose. They argue that many of our ordinary judgments about identity are not really about whether things are identical in the absolute sense, but are about whether things are highly similar in all relevant respects, depending on the context at hand. In other terms, on their proposal :
"An ordinary identity statement ''a is identical to b,'' made or evaluated in a conversational context C, is to be understood as a claim to the effect that a is identical C to b-or Id C(a,b), for short-which in turn is taken to mean that a is highly C similar to b in all relevant C respects. In other terms, Id C( a,b) iff for every relevant C respect r, any difference in r between a and b is, if it exists at all, negligible C, where it is assumed that a difference that is negligible in one context need not be so in another. (Douven and Decock 2009: 67) It looks, prima facie, as though it were a version of the thesis (R ) above, of the relativity of identity. But, as they point out, Douven and Decok do not relatives identity to sortals, but to contexts, the point being that to each context corresponds a certain kind of similarity. To each context C is paired with a metric similarity space SC appropriate to that context 21 . For each respect that is relevant in a context, the context contains a corresponding similarity space. For instance if color is a relevant respect in C, then SC will contain a color space; if shape is relevant, SC will include a shape space; if time is relevant, it will include a temporal space; and so on. For each similarity space r ∈ SC; let d r (.,.) be the distance function associated with that space; so d r (a,b) measures the distance between the representations of objects a and b in r. Also associated with each r ∈ SC is a threshold value t r C >0; which may be different for different r and alsothough for reasons given above this may be taken as optional-different for the same r in different contexts C. Then the ordinary or folk concept of identity is defined thus: Although it is not the relative identity One might worry that the relation of high similarity in relevant respects Id C (x,y) may suffer from the same difficulties as those of (R). In particular it seems that we can reproduce the reasoning which led Wiggins to conclude that relative identity is incoherent, if we accept that two things can be the same F but not the same G, and transpose to contexts 22 . But on reflexion, this should not be a problem: something can very well be Id (C ) to another in context C while not being Id (C* ) in another context C*. And the indiscernability of identical does not hold without restrictions. It is possible for there to be indiscernible objects which are distinct and distinct objects which are indiscernible, given the appropriate contextual restrictions.
It seems that the relation Id ( C) is the appropriate candidate for a functionalist theory of identity. The relation of highly relevant similarity is the one which plays the identity role: is distinct from the epistemological one. But unless one has shown that the latter can be reduced to the former, the absolutist sense of identity is to stay with us, for we want to be able to ask whether two things are identical or not, simpliciter. In order to deal with the ontological issue and to find an equivalent of the functionalist view of identity for properties, one would have to defend a notion of weak identity and of weak discernibility. There are attempts in this direction, including defences of vague identity against the absolute notion (Parsons 2000). But it is not clear that they succeed (Salmon 2002 , Hawley 2009 ). I shall not examine this point here. The point, however, that I want to press is that if a functionalist theory of identity can work, it would have to have a uniform functional property, which would be along the lines of FI. And if it is along these lines, it is bound to be unstable, as I have argued above.
Conclusion
I have tried to make sense of one alternative to the classical absolute notion of identity, which I have formulated on the model of the functionalist conception of truth. Both are unstable, and cannot locate the functional property at the correct level. The notion of highly relevant similarity seems to give us what we need, but it is a purely epistemological theory. So if we want to have a theory of the metaphysical relation of identity, we have to stick to the absolutist view, the one that Ruth Marcus showed to be dependent on the very notion of an object 23 .
. 23 Ruth Marcus "Possibilia and possible world", Modalities, p.213
